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A few months ago the Sunday New York Times raised  the ques-
tion,  "A  Meatpacker  Cartel Up Ahead?"  (Robbins).  At  about the
same time,  in an article discussing the sale  of the Farr Feedlot  in
Greeley,  Colorado,  to National Farms,  a Bass brothers operation,
the  Ohio Farmers  Union  newsletter  stated,  "What  had been a text-
book case of many  firms engaging  in price competition  is converting
into industrial-style  oligopoly."  A couple of months earlier, an article
in FarmFutures  reported,  "Of  ...  immediate  concern  to  producers
. . are fears that (the) trend toward fewer packers will soon lead to
a less competitive market for their livestock"  (Charlier).
These and other stories in the popular press  could lead one to be-
lieve that,  after several years  of docile  acceptance  of industrial
merger delirium, the public has come to realize that there might be a
societal  interest in the structure  of markets.  My purposes  are to:
1.  examine  the extent to  which  concentration  of market power
exists, 2.  briefly review how the welfare  of society is affected and
3.  identify  some  policy  options for dealing  with  market structure  if,
indeed,  it draws new attention  as a public policy issue.
Market Structure as a Policy  Issue
This issue deals with the concentration  of market,  or economic
power,  among a few, relatively  large business firms.  Economic tradi-
tionalists  refer  to this  as  monopoly or variants thereof.  More recent
economic  thought  encompasses  aggregate  or  conglomerate  concen-
tration (Caswell; Mueller).  John Kenneth Galbraith in his  twenty-
year reflection on his seminal work,  The New Industrial State, called
it  ".  ..  the promiscuous  exercise  of power  in modern  economic  life
by the large enterprise"  (1988,  p.  376).
A.C.  Hoffman in his 1980  fellows  address to the American  Agri-
cultural Economics Association (AAEA) stated,  "The rise of econom-
ic power and its replacement of the Invisible Hand of Adam Smith as
the regulator of economic activity  is surely one  of the most important
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ally increasing,  industrial concentration  abounds.  For example,  cen-
sus data show that the largest fifty corporations  control one-fourth  of
all U.S.  manufacturing  activity.  Further,  nearly  10  percent  of all
U.S. manufacturing  and mining assets were gobbled-up in corporate
mergers during just the first four years of this decade  (Geithman,  p.
265).
Among food manufacturers,  the largest  100 firms control about  75
percent of all assets.  About 25 percent of all food products are sold in
oligopolistic  markets  and another  25  percent  in markets  dominated
by a few sellers (Mueller  1983,  pp. 855-856,  859).  The number of food
manufacturing  industries  with  four-firm  concentration  ratios  (CR4)
below  35 percent,  considered  to  be  unconcentrated,  has  decreased
by more than a third since the mid-1960s  (Connor et al.,  pp. 135-136).
Ward reports that the four largest steer and heifer slaughtering firms
controlled 64 percent  of that industry's business in  1986,  up from just
29 percent  10 years  earlier,  and that the four largest producers  of
boxed beef had captured 82 percent of that market by 1986 (p.  29).
Quail et  al.  have shown that high levels  of buyer  concentration
exist in most procurement  markets for fed cattle.  Buyer CR4s in 1980
ranged  from  a low of 33  percent  in the  Michigan-Indiana-Ohio  mar-
ket to a high of 97 percent in the Kansas-Western  Missouri-Northern
Oklahoma  market.  For  all 13  regional markets,  buyer CR4s aver-
aged 67  percent in 1980,  up from 48 percent in  1971.  High concentra-
tion can also  be found in farm input markets,  particularly pesticides
and  self-pollinating  seeds,  both  with the  CR4s  approaching  60  per-
cent,  and farm machinery with a CR4 exceeding  70  percent (Hen-
derson,  pp.  18-19).
Concentration  of industrial  power  has occurred  simultaneously
with the concurrent  existence  of numerous  small firms operating  in
the same  industries  with virtually  no market power  or control.  Gal-
braith  first recognized  this bimodal  organization  in  The New  Indus-
trial State in  1967 and subsequently  labeled the modes  as the  "plan-
ning system"  for the powerful  firms, and the  "market system"  for
the  unconcentrated  part  (1973).  It  is  now  generally  recognized  that
this asymmetric  structure well describes the food industries (Mueller
1983,  p.  859),  and much recent  attention has  focused  on evidence
that even the  farm  sector  is  caught up  in the  same  phenomenon
(Phillips,  pp.  52-53).  The  point  is,  one  cannot use evidence  of small
firms and unconcentrated markets to deny the existence of economic
power.
Implications  of Concentrated Markets
Both  economic  theory and  empirical  evidence  show that the  per-
formance  of the economy  and the welfare  of its peoples  are influ-
enced  by market or industrial  concentration.  Since Cournot's devel-
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1838,  it has been  theoretically  possible  to demonstrate  that market
power is  positively  related  to prices  charged  and profits  and  nega-
tively related to prices paid and quantity marketed. With theoretical
ease this can now  be extended  to demonstrate  a causal relationship
between concentration  and  dead-weight  loss to the  economy  (Vari-
an,  pp. 422-424).
Empirical  evidence  is largely  consistent  with theoretical  expecta-
tions.  For example,  in a  carefully specified  study of 31  geograph-
ically separate  retail grocery  markets  using  1974  data,  Marion et  al.
found  a statistically  significant  positive  relationship  between CR4
and prices  paid by consumers  (pp.  99-107).  They estimated  that an-
nual "monopoly overcharges"  to consumers in all 263  Standard Met-
ropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSAs) amounted  to more than $600  mil-
lion  (p.  139).  Using 1972-1977  data, Connor  et al.  estimated  price
overcharges  due to seller  concentration  among U.S.  food  manufac-
turers at between 8.2 and  15.8 percent of total sales revenues (pp.
343-345).  On the other side of the market,  in an analysis of buyer
concentration  in fed  cattle markets,  Quail et al.  found that prices
paid for live cattle decline at least 10  cents per cwt.  for each  10 per-
centage  point increase in buyer CR4 (p. 50).
Turning to nonagricultural  industries,  Rhoades found 42 studies of
banking as of 1982  which positively  related local bank concentration
to some  aspect of prices charged.  More generally,  in analyzing  data
on  136 consumer  goods industries  in the  1958-1977 period,  Weiss re-
ports  a statistically  significant  positive  relationship between  concen-
tration and prices.
Numerous studies have been made  of the relationship between
concentration  and profits.  Vernon reviewed 32 such studies that had
appeared  in the literature through  1969.  He concluded  that "almost
all  . . . have yielded  significant  positive  relationships  for years  of
prosperity  or recession,  though they have depended  on a wide vari-
ety of data and methods"  (p.  61).  For all food manufacturing  indus-
tries,  Connor et al.  put monopoly profits at 3.1 percent of the total
value of sales, ranging  from highs of roughly  10 percent for chewing
gum,  flavorings and soft drinks to a low of 0 in  15 of the 59 industries
studied  (pp.  343-345).  Across retail  food  markets,  as  CR4  increases
from 40  percent to 70 percent,  profits increase by at least 33 percent
and in some cases by more than 200 percent (Marion et al., p.  91).
More than high prices and profits have been directly linked to con-
centration.  Mueller  summarizes much of the evidence  on other per-
formance  impacts  this way:  "There  is evidence  that  . . . market
power  contributes  to  inflation,  results  in disparity  in  wages,  causes
an excessive  proliferation  of products  and enormous  outlays  for ad-
vertising and promotion,  distorts consumer buying preferences
among  brands,  and defines  consumers'  nutritional habits"  (1983,  p.
856).  F.M.  Scherer,  perhaps the leading industrial organization
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the exercise  of market power exceeds 6 percent of GNP  (p.  408).
Nonetheless,  while  studies  show that  monopolistic  price  over-
charges  and profits  are positively influenced  by market power,  they
typically  are  less than  predicted  by  theory.  Even  economists  active
in experimental  economics,  where  all aspects  of market structure
can  be controlled,  unanimously  expressed,  at  a  1988  AAEA  sym-
posium,  the inability  to generate full monopoly prices under any lab-
oratory  conditions.
One plausible  explanation for the failure to find evidence  of full
monopoly  profits  has been  put forward  by  Scherer.  He  argues  that
the  appropriate measure of profits is the discounted  present value of
future  profit streams  (1988,  p.  381),  whereas  empirical  studies have
examined  profits earned  in historic  accounting  periods.  Surely mar-
ket share  and sales  growth rates are  important determinants  of fu-
ture profit  streams.  Thus,  entry-limit pricing would seem to be fully
consistent with long-term profit maximization,  as are  additional costs
for  such things  as  advertising  and  new  product  development.  Per-
haps  if empirical  studies  focused  on the  current value  of long-term
profits,  the evidence of social welfare loss due to the exercise of mar-
ket power  would be even more  compelling regarding the need  for a
public policy response.
A Digression  on Conglomerate  Power
Both theory  and most studies of market power-performance  link-
ages  focus  on power  held  by one or a few  corporations operating
within a specific product market. However,  much of the recent wave
of corporate  mergers has been between  firms operating  in different
markets,  or  so-called  conglomerate  mergers.  Mueller  has  specified
three forms of business  behavior that are uniquely available  to con-
glomerates:  cross-subsidization,  reciprocity  and  competitive  for-
bearance.  None  of these  enhance  efficiency  and all are  used to  in-
crease  a firm's dominance  in its various markets  (1970,  pp.  101-106).
Both "golden  parachutes"  and  "white knights"  have  become
standard  fixtures  in  conglomerate  mergers.  The  former  guarantees
top managers  significant  financial awards  regardless  of the outcome
of a merger,  and the latter accepts  a merger partner based on the
sole qualification that it will not force established management of the
acquired  company to  relinquish control.  Not only do these  strategies
divert earnings  from  stockholders  to  top  management,  they protect
entrenched and often inefficient management.
Causes of Market Power
Most industrial  organization texts  list scale economies  in plant op-
erations,  large  capital  requirements,  control over  scarce  resources,
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Research results point to the dominance of product differentiation  as
an entry barrier  and  the related  role  of extensive  advertising  (Hen-
derson,  pp.  7-10).  "The  evidence  indicates  that the major  causal
force propelling  the increasing  concentration  are the  advantages
(real  and  pucuniary)  of large-scale  advertising  and  promotion  of
products lending  themselves  to product  differentiation"  (Mueller
1983,  p.  856).  To this we  would now have to add mergers  as  a prin-
cipal cause,  particularly of aggregate concentration.
Policy  Options
Many  economists,  certainly  most industrial  organization  scholars
who have examined  food-related  industries,  are  calling for renewed
attention  to microeconomic  policies,  specifically  those addressing
concentration  of power.  Regarding  microeconomic  policy  issues,
Galbraith  has  stated,  "These  now rival,  perhaps exceed,  mac-
roeconomic  concerns  in their social  urgency"  (1988,  p.  376).  As  ex-
amples he cites problems  in housing-"the  great industrial default of
capitalism"-energy  and  oil,  agriculture,  the aging  industrial  sector
and the  competitive  relationship  between  older and younger indus-
trial economies.
Unfortunately,  assessment  of  microeconomic  policy  options  is
hampered by the  fall of microeconomics,  for many,  into what  might
be  called a recreational  technicality,  that is,  a search  for and ex-
pression  of unchanging  truth.  Policy  analysts,  by  contrast,  must  of
necessity  see economics  as  a  subject  in constant accommodation  to
social,  political and institutional  change.  Thus,  I highlight the im-
plications of the  following  policy  options  in conceptual terms rather
than with the technical specificity of economic  determinism.
Laissez-faire
This option  is akin to what the agricultural  policy analyst refers to
as  "no  program."  The  government  exercises  no  control  over  the
structure  of markets  or  business behavior.  It relies  on the  invisible
hand of competition to assure  that what  is  in the best interest of the
powerful  corporations  is also  in the best interest  of the people at
large.  Proponents  either deny the existence  of concentrated  power
or ignore the negative impacts that such power has on the welfare of
society.
Events  leading  to the antitrust movement  of the  late  19th  century
pretty  much  gave  lie  to presumptions  of the proponents.  Nonethe-
less,  the  laissez-faire  concept has given  rise to several  "innovative"
economic  theories  designed  to provide it  with intellectual  respecta-
bility.  Two  such  developments  are:  1.  countervailing  power  and
2.  contestable markets.  The first, put forward by Galbraith in Amer-
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the monopoly power of one corporation can be offset by the  exercise
of power by another.  The second,  advanced by William Baumol and
colleagues,  holds  that potential rather than actual rivalry  is the  key
competitive  force.  As  such,  barriers to entry  are more important
than actual  concentration.  In a  practical  sense,  however,  I suspect
that the  existence of only modest entry barriers in meatpacking is  of
little consolation to the feeder who can find  only one buyer to bid on
his cattle.
Central Planning
This option deals with the direction of the industrial  sector by the
public sector,  or direct government control.  It includes,  but is broad-
er than,  public  ownership.  While  this is  an enigma in a  market-
driven economy,  it has been used  in the United States. Both land
grant  universities  and  the Tennessee  Valley  Authority  stand as  ex-
amples  of state-owned  businesses.  In an  agricultural  policy context,
this  option  is  roughly  equivalent  to mandatory  production  controls.
Philosophically,  it substitutes  the  "heavy  hand"  of government  for
the invisible hand of the market as the guide for economic  activity.
Recently  this  option  has been given  a new  label:  national indus-
trial policy.  This, proponents  argue,  would use  the  state  to accom-
plish what cannot be accomplished  by private decision makers with-
in the  context  of macroeconomic  policy.  Invidious  comparisons  are
made with the Japanese  post-war  economic  "miracle,"  which  is at-
tributed to comprehensive industrial  planning by the Japanese  Min-
istry of International  Trade and Industry  (MITI).  But after a careful
review  of MITI,  Mueller  concludes  ".  . . most of Japan's  industrial
policy involves  old-fashioned  protectionism  in such industries  as ag-
riculture  and textiles,  and  investments  in  declining  industries  ... "
(1983,  p. 861).
Essentially,  such policies  replace concentrated  market power with
concentrated  government  power.  They are  justified  on the  basis  of
market failures;  they,  in turn,  hold the economy  hostage  to non-
market  failures.
Regulation
Under  this  option,  public  policy promotes  private  enterprise,  but
with direct governmental  regulation  of certain aspects of business
behavior.  That is, the abuse of concentrated  market power  is limited
by exercising  public control over how it is used.  Philosophically,  this
might be  labeled the "gentle hand"  approach.  Examples abound,
starting with the establishment  of the Interstate  Commerce Commis-
sion in 1887.  Regulation was well on track as the  "American way"  in
the post-depression period until Reaganomics  rode into town with
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moving  away from regulation except in areas such as food and drug
quality,  safety and natural monopoly.
Traditional  critics of regulation  argued  largely from a free market
perspective.  During the  1970s the attack  on regulation was joined
from  the  left  by those  who  concluded  that the regulators  had  been
captured  by the regulated.  With this intellectual  reinforcement,  de-
regulation  attained respectability.  Now,  after nearly a decade  of de-
regulation  initiatives,  it might be a propitious time to revisit the  gen-
tle  hand  of economic  regulation  as  a means  of addressing  issues
arising from the rise in market power.
Antitrust
Antitrust policy is designed to curb the establishment and abuse of
market  power and to promote competition.  It has been the law  of
the  land  since the enactment  of the Sherman  Act  in  1890,  although
enforcement  has varied  widely.  The  wave of mergers  during the
Reagan years has resulted from putting people in charge who be-
lieve that price fixing is the only form of trust that violates the princi-
ple (but surely not the letter) of the law.
The basic  purpose  of antitrust  is to  assure that markets  are  struc-
tured and  firms behave  in ways that  are sufficiently  competitive  so
that private  enterprise  performs  in a socially  acceptable  manner.  It
is, in essence,  the "visible hand"  that rules on what  one shall not do.
That  is,  antitrust  policy proscribes  conduct  such as  mergers,  exclu-
sionary dealing,  price fixing,  collusion and monopolization that is  in-
jurious to the welfare of society.
Even though  enforcement  of our antitrust  laws has fallen on hard
times in recent years,  the principle  of competition-enhancing  public
policy has not been invalidated.  At the  least,  helping the  public un-
derstand the cost to society of such laxity is an appropriate challenge
to policy educators.
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